Abstract
The fact that there is a highly uneven pace of economic development in the post-Cold War period suggests there may be traps to successful economic and social advance. This paper argues that religious nationalism can trap, and has trapped, countries. It demonstrates that countries under the thrall of religious nationalism are likely to be extremely corrupt, spawning rapidly growing reform movements within established religious committees that are committed to purification of the body politic through an appeal to ancient texts and atavistic practices.
Contemporary examples are the Christian Pentecostal movement in Africa, the spread of the Islamic Salafi movement in the Middle East, and the Hindutva movement in India.
Unfortunately looking backward is not a recipe for progress. These movements engender conflict, closure to foreign ideas, all the while failing to curb corruption. They fragment the very communities they purport to cleanse. Using data on refugees over the period 1990-2012, statistical analysis demonstrates that the most important humanitarian refugee crises in the post-1990 period have arisen from civil wars, most engendered by religious conflict and or the overlap of ethnic and religious conflict.
"Well, the emptiness is endless, cold as the clay/You can always come back, but you can't come back all the way."
1 Bob Dylan
The Argument
Why are some countries struggling with economic development, unable to generate sustained growth in per capita income and the human development index? Given the remarkably uneven patchy record of countries in the post-Cold War era when Communist orthodoxy was decisively relegated to the dustbin of history one wonders.
After all there were commentators -now derided as hopelessly naive and misguidedwho argued that democracy and free unfettered market principles had triumphed after 1990.
2
Spreading globally, sweeping around the ideological fetters that had choked off opportunitiesthat had long smothered entrepreneurial and innovating energies with debilitating corruption, bureaucratic rent seeking, and fiscal devotion to the cruel gods of warfare -adherence to regular election cycles, legal protection of property rights, and the dismantling of protectionism were supposed to demolish poverty everywhere.
Unfortunately the Pollyanna-like pundits were completely wrong. Traps exist, limiting development in countries throughout Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. One of these traps involves religion. To be specific the trap I am concerned with in this paper centers on religious nationalism.
The argument is simple. It consists of four steps: 4 Step One: Religious nationalism empowers those who speak for God, the guardians of the Truth. Garnering a monopoly over public discourse concerning laws and policies -enjoying virtual immunity from dissent, wielding the weapon of slander, branding one's critics as heretics -the guardians of public virtue aggrandize power. Power corrupts. Despite its claim to channel virtue, the rulers of religious nationalistic states encourage naked plunder by opportunists lurking in their inner circles.
Step Two: The corruption of rulers and their opportunistic lackeys and henchmen in religious nationalist states undermines their credibility among the largely disenfranchised truebelievers of the faith. In turn true-believers gather together -often in secrecy -spearheading religious reform movements aimed at purifying the rituals, ideologies and social norms of the faith. To purify their religious practices they turn to the distant past, to the texts and oral traditions of the founders of their faith. In so doing they turn their back on ideas and norms emerging in generations subsequent to that of the founders. Embracing militant revivalism, their movement ultimately walks a knife-edge between dissent and outright dissidence.
Step Three: Conflict between the official guardians of the Truth and the dissidents tears apart the social fabric. In the worst cases it spawns civil war, destroying infrastructure, squashing national unity, dismantling government institutions, destroying trust. Economic development languishes.
Step Four: Revivalism feasts off economic failure. Knowing one is one of the blessed, secure in one's knowledge of Truth (in some religions enjoying a guarantee of an afterlife in Paradise) offers comfort for the starved, oppressed, outcast masses. The hold of religion over the populace is strengthened. Getting the state to better represent, embody, the tenets of its faith, becomes more -not less -attractive. The religious trap slams shut.
An important corollary of this analysis is democracy is unlikely to change outcomes.
Democracy is not equivalent to human rights. Democracy is majority rule. If the majority is committed to a particular faith -and in states where religious nationalism prevails this is inevitably the case if for no other reason than repression of anti-religious expression by the state -elections will strengthen, not weaken the credibility of religious nationalist ideology.
Reformist religious parties contesting any one particular menu of religious nationalistic policies put in place by the government through elections may well change the complexion of policy making. But it will not move the government into the liberal nationalist camp.
To make the case that religious traps do exist and have retarded economic advance in the developing world, this paper proceeds as follows: the second section proposes a metric capturing the range of types of nationalism, running from religious nationalism to liberal There is nothing better than having God on your side. Moreover there is nothing more comforting than knowing your enemy does not. Religious nationalism advertises these claims, flaunting them as part and parcel of official ideology.
The end of the Cold War ushered in an era in which an increasing number of nationstates claimed to channel God's word as a matter of law and policy, foreign and domestic. To some extent this is because the number of countries increased after 1990. To some extent this is because the newly minted countries of the post-1990 era were created out of religiously tinted conflicts that exploded as self described secular states like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia collapsed. To some extent this is because religiosity was enhanced during the Cold War years, as so-called godless Communism confronted the non-Communist powers globally.
With the conflict between Communism and market oriented liberal democracy a dead letter, a new type of Cold War emerged, this built on the confrontation between liberal nationalism and religious nationalism. It is hubris to claim one can comprehensively measure religious nationalism accurately differentiating it from the liberal nationalism characteristic of North America and Europe. That said, Mosk (2014b) comes up with a crude approximation, the index Librelin ranging between zero (extreme religious nationalism) and unity (extreme liberal nationalism). The remainder of this section reproduces the text provided by Mosk (2014b: 13-14) .
The Librelin variable is constructed as follows. There are two components both normalized to one, averaged together yielding a range for Librelin running between 0 and 1.
That is:
(1) Librelin = ½ (SECIN) + ½ (GOVLAW).
The first component, SECIN captures secular orientation in government. Using data from the Association of Religion Data Archives (2013, 2014) , SECIN is calculated from four measures of secular orientation:
(2) SECIN = ¼ (FRS) + ¼ (LAWR) + ¼ (FEXB) + ¼ (CONFR)
where FRS = Freedom of expression of beliefs (normalized to one); LAWR = is the legal system largely based on religious law (normalized to one); FEXB = a measure of freedom of expression of beliefs (normalized to one); and CONFR = does the constitution and/or the legal system guarantee freedom of religion?
The second component of Librelin captures government efficiency and rule of law. Its acronym is GOVLAW. GOVLAW is computed as follows:
where GOVFUN = indicator of the quality of government functioning; and LAW = indicator of the rule of law. As with the measure SECIN the underlying data is from the Association of Religion Data Archives (2013, 2014 Hindu groups began fashioning bricks, transporting them to Ayodhya, using them to rebuild the temple to Rama at the site of the mosque. Riots between Hindus and Muslims broke out in 1989. Scores were killed. The backwash from the riots reshaped Indian politics. Formed in protest over government handling of the affair, a Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerged. BJP leaders argued that the attempt of the national government to settle the dispute in an even-handed manner was actually discrimination pure and simple. In their eyes it convincingly proved the ruling Congress Party was only too willing to stomp upon the interests, the rights, of the Hindu majority in order to garner Muslim votes. Perhaps to them it was no more than divide and rule cynical politics, reminiscent of British Raj rule.
The Hindutva movement has had a chilling effect on freedom of speech and publishing in India. Invoking Article 295a of the Indian Penal Code, advocates of a "pure" Vedic form of
Hinduism have prevented the dissemination of books on Hinduism that discuss a wide variety of practices within the faith. 16 The argument made by the opponents of freedom of the press is that writing on Hinduism that strays from the "Hindutva" party line denigrates their followers, insults them, subjecting them to possible ridicule and psychological pain. To be sure many of the folk myths of Hinduism are provocative, off-color, lascivious and sensual. Not puritanical.
But so what? All religious movements have their off-color sides, emerging from its gritty folk movements where the profane intermixes with the pure. Despite this fact because the Indian code is supposed to insure there is no injury to any one religious community within the country, the Hindutva advocates have found a legal mechanism for banning books whose accounts of folk traditions and caste discrimination they consider denigrating to Hinduism. It is ironic that a group that has attacked Muslim communities in waves of pogrom like riots feels comfortable invoking a "negative freedom" inspired law crafted to prevent the exercise of religious freedom accorded to any one faith from disparaging the practice of other faiths. In short the Hindutva movement is no friend of liberal nationalism as applied to India. Some critics of the politics of the movement have gone as far as accusing it of being Fascistic. II. Exile -forced exit -has re-emerged as an grim indicator of the inability of groups to co-exist, to forge long-lasting compromise, to carve out viable political consensus.
While it is not true that all of these crises are the upshots of religious cleavage the fact is most of the world's refugees -those accounting for a majority of the number of refugee-years generated in the post-Cold War era -are the victims of ethno-religious disputes. By ethnoreligious is meant the overlap of ethnicity and religion. The term captures the common-sense notion that ethnicity and religious affiliation often go together because members of a particular faith, a specific sect, intermarry. Over time the tendency of ethnic groups to restrict marriage and reproduction to their group goes hand in hand with the tendency of religious sects to differentiate themselves from one another.
With this in mind consider -1990-4, 1995-9, 2000-4, 2005-9 , and 2010-12 -and one three year period.
In appraising the statistics presented in the table one must recognize that the High
Commissioner figures are underestimates of the actual number of persons displaced, dispatched to exile.
The first point jumping out of the table is the fact that almost 60% of all refugee-years occurred in small number of countries (to be precise fourteen in number). In terms of population 59% of the refugee-years generated between 1990 and 2012 occurred in countries with less than 2% of the world's population.
The second point established by the table is that countries in which refugee crises are substantial are corrupt and awash in religiosity. It should be emphasized that the sample of countries used in computing the group averages in the table is restricted to countries for which the number of refugees exceeds 1,000 in at least one year between 1990 and 2012. As a result data for most of the world's least corrupt countries -in Western Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and so forth -are not used to generate averages for the table. If these countries were included the level of corruption (the cpi) for the group with the lowest level of refugee-years per capita would be close to 0.9. Not surprisingly this group would enjoy the most elevated level for the liberal-religious nationalism index (Librelin), an average close to one.
The third conclusion to be culled from Table 1 is that experiencing a refugee crisis deters economic growth. This is hardly surprising. While some refugee crises are due to adverse weather events or geological disturbances -typhoons, hurricanes, tsumanis -most are the result of civil conflicts. These conflicts are often protracted, as testified by the low level of the CONrefr variable that acts as a proxy for the concentration of the crisis within a single five year (or three year) period. For instance the CONrefr average is considerably higher for the group with the lowest level of refugee-years per capita.
With Table 2 we can look at the problem of why and where refugee crises break out in terms of the liberal religious-nationalism variable Librelin. [ Table 2 To shed more light on the role of ethnic-religious divisiveness in generating crises spawning refugees it is useful to examine the circumstances surrounding the humanitarian crises erupting in each of the fourteen countries in the group with the highest level of refugeeyears per capita. Table 3 sets the stage for this discussion.
[ Table 3 about here]. The table provides two sets of ethno-cultural fractionalization/diversity proxies, as well as estimates of the religious makeup of the national populations. Per capita income advance (or decline in the case of indices for 2010 failing short of 100) is also recorded for these countries.
All of the refugee crises involved stem from civil wars. One of these wars is a pure war of secession (East Timor/Timor-Leste), several are many ethnic in nature (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Rwanda). The remainder definitely involve religious differences as -it turns outdoes Timor-Leste. The discussion of the cases is organized in the following order: Timor-Leste first, then the African ethnic wars, then the remainder according to geographical region (Africa first followed by Asia, Eastern Europe/Former Soviet Union, and finally the Middle East).
A former Portuguese colony, East Timor was slotted to gain independence in the mid1970s, opening the door for invasion by Indonesia whose district West Timor bordered on East
Timor. Successfully invading East Timor, Indonesia ruled the land with an iron fist, suppressing secessionist rebellion with extrajudicial executions, torture, and politically generated famines. Table 3 shows, three of the four countries involved experienced declines in per capita income as an outcome of internecine conflict. 20 All four wars resulted from contested elections or coups, one faction -typically an ethnic group or coalition of ethnic groups -seized control of the government, channelling largess to their own faction at the expense of rivals.
Spillover from Liberian conflicts -Liberian leader Charles Taylor assembled a rebel army consisting mainly of Gio and Mano tribes who moved into sanctuaries in the country's neighbors as it retreated -created chaos in Sierra Leone. Refugees from the Liberian warsmainly children -were recruited by Taylor as soldiers buttressing his effort to build a rebel base in Sierra Leone. The fact that diamond mining was a major economic activity in Sierra Leone allowed both government and rebel forces to sustain their bloody conflict.
The Burundi/Rwanda turmoil followed a fairly similar trajectory. Hutus and Tutsis were at each others' throats in both states that had been carved out a former Belgian colony (height differentiates the two groups, the average Tutsi being significantly taller than the typical Hutu).
Genocide was a horrifying characteristic of both civil wars: in Rwanda it reached a peak in the bloodletting aimed at Tutsis during 1994; in Burundi it had been on-going problem from the so much for the claim that any religion has an unblemished record of eschewing violence.
The wars of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia illustrate with a vengeance the truism that atheistic Communist ideology was unable to suppress deep seeded religious differences. In the case of the Armenia/Azerbaijan conflict bloodletting was generated by interstate conflict over the Nogorno-Karabakh region that Armenia was ultimately able to wrest away from Azerbaijan. As important as territory in explaining the violence, the bottom line is that Armenia is heavily Christian; Azerbaijan Muslim. The fact that civilian massacres were a major factor in the military confrontation between two freshly minted states spun out of the Soviet Union is testimony to the ethno-religious hatred and distrust that stymied a diplomatic In an economic development perspective refugee crises riding the whirlwind of warfare deter growth. They undermine trust, entrammelling trade and cooperation; they slam the breaks on infrastructure construction; they complicate governing; dealing with him draws upon fiscal resources that could be better used elsewhere. Worst they can end up generating traps that are self reinforcing barriers to economic progress. Religious traps are a particular variant of such a trap, one that appears to be growing by leaps and bounds during the post-1990 period.
According to the logic of my argument religious traps are intimately tied up with religious atavism, with revivalism, with the veneration of a so-called first generation religious purity that has been sullied by corruption over time. Hence movements like Pentecostalism, Salafism, the Hindutva movement emerge, aimed at the purification of faith. Channelled into individual piety there is no problem. Politicized, harnessed to religious nationalism, there are dangers aplenty. Elevating the archaic in the classroom is a barrier to progress. As well it throws up walls, immense looming barriers to the spread of knowledge, barriers to reasoned public debate over ideas and policies.
Worse yet, religious atavism discourages communication between distinct religious traditions. It is arrogant in the extreme: my god channels the Truth, your god is spurious. I am blessed, you are cursed. In short it sets the stage for dehumanizing the Other. Once dehumanized -once outcast as a pariah -the Other becomes a prime target for genocide or the local pogrom.
Religion is an ideology. Like all other ideologies -democracy, Communism, Fascism -it can and does serve to justify brutality. As humans we live with divided brains: some regions of our cortex support revenge, fear, flight, and violence; some portions support strategic cooperative cost/benefit behavior. 22 Our better angels make the wheels of commerce spin, promoting trust and cooperation crucial to liberal nationalism and market oriented behavior. As well our better angels render religion a keystone of social cooperation, spreading belief in an omnipotent deity and/or a code of ethics that dictates "super-virtuous" behavior. 23 Lamentably the better angels of our nature are not always in control of our behavior. When the demons of revenge are in charge religion -like any other ideology -can and does spearhead brutality.
Revivalist religious sects are particularly susceptible to foment violence. Rejecting much of the knowledge accounting for the progress made by humanity in reducing the outbreak of warfare and domestic brutality -however meager this may seem -particularly the progress made during and after the Enlightenment, atavistic religious movements are prone to drift toward the demons. That they clearly differentiate between their adherents and the Other makes it all the easier for them to turn cruel and despotic.
To those who suspect an anti-religion rants lies at the heart of this paper let me be clear about one thing: I have no objection to religion per se. I do take issue with it when it is used to defeat economic advance, trash human rights, and dispatch peace between peoples by dehumanizing the Other. Dylan (2004: 582) .
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Notes:
a The refugee data are for countries of origin, not country of settlement. Countries in which the number of refugee-years per capita in any year between 1990 and 2012 is less than 1000 are excluded from the sample of countries. The variables for corruption and atheism/agnosticism are for 2010. For some countries in the sample data on per capita income was unavailable for 1990 in which case figures for the first year for which data is available was used to compute the ratio of income per capita.
b The variable avgrefr is the average for the five year refugee-years for the periods 1990-94, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009, and 2010-2012 Iraq 1,735.9 0.6 1.5 120.6 n.a.
Sources:
See Table 1 and en.wikipedia.org (2014). 
